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Abstract
The frequency of interaction facilitates collusion by reducing
gains from defection. Theory has shown that under imperfect mon-
itoring flexibility may hinder cooperation by inducing punishment
after too few noisy signals, making collusion impossible in many en-
vironments (Sannikov and Skrzypacsz, AER 2007). The interplay of
these forces should generate an inverse U-shaped effect of flexibility
on collusion. We test for the first time these theoretical predictions -
central to antitrust policy - in a laboratory experiment featuring an
indefinitely repeated Cournot duopoly, with different degrees of flex-
ibility. Results turn out to depend crucially on whether subjects can
communicate with each other at the beginning of a supergame (ex-
plicit collusion) or not (tacit collusion). Without communication,
the incidence of collusion is low throughout and not significantly
related to flexibility; when subjects are allowed to communicate,
collusion is significantly more frequent in the treatment with inter-
mediate flexibility than in the treatments with low or high flexibility.
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Flexibility, the ability to react swiftly to others’ choices, is commonly
seen as a factor that facilitates cooperation. The logic is that flexibility
reduces the gains from unilateral defections by drawing punishment nearer.
Axelrod, in his Evolution of Cooperation (1984, p. 129), puts it as follows:
“[One] way to enlarge the shadow of the future is to make the interactions
more frequent. In such a case the next interaction occurs sooner, and hence
the next move looms larger than it otherwise would.” Friedman and Oprea
(2012) offer strong experimental support for a positive effect of flexibility on
cooperation. They implement a finite horizon repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma
and find a strong positive relationship between the frequency with which
subjects could adjust their actions and the rate of cooperation.1
Though intuitive, this established role of flexibility is theoretically ro-
bust only for games in which players can perfectly observe each others’
actions. As first shown by Abreu, Milgrom and Pearce (1991), with imper-
fect monitoring flexibility may actually harm cooperation. The reason is
that when imperfect information arrives frequently, high flexibility forces
players to react to ‘bad news’ early, when it is still very noisy. This gen-
erates many costly mistakes which erode the value of cooperation. This
negative effect of flexibility counteracts the positive effect due to the re-
duced gains from defection. Sannikov and Skrzypacz (2007) show in a
variety of oligopolistic environments that for high levels of flexibility the
negative effect dominates the positive one and renders collusion impossible.
For low levels of flexibility, on the other hand, the positive effect tends to
dominate the negative one and an increase in flexibility will make collusion
easier. The remarkable consequence is that the impact of flexibility on the
sustainability of collusion is non-monotonic.
The channel through which flexibility hinders cooperation under imper-
1In the extreme case, in which subjects could adjust their actions almost continuously,
the median rate of cooperation was as high as 90%. At the other extreme, in which
subjects could adjust their actions only once, cooperation rates were close to zero.
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fect monitoring is subtle though.2 Certainly the intuition for the negative
effect is less straightforward than the positive one that defection can be
punished sooner. One may therefore question the behavioral relevance of
the negative effect of flexibility. Does cooperation unravel with sufficiently
high flexibility when monitoring is imperfect, or will the positive effect still
dominate? Can one observe a non-monotonic effect of flexibility on co-
operation in this case? These questions have important implications for
our understanding of collusion and for antitrust policy.3 They also have
implications for other settings where imperfect observability is the rule
rather than the exception, such as team production, principal-agent rela-
tionships, international agreements and reputation-based market strategies
(e.g. Strausz 2009).
This paper presents an experimental study designed to start answering
these questions. We implement in the laboratory an indefinitely repeated
quantity-setting duopoly game in discrete time with imperfect monitoring,
analogous to that studied by Sannikov and Skrzypacz (2007). Players do
not observe each other’s quantity choices; they only observe price which
is a noisy signal of total quantity. Across treatments we vary inflexibility
(∆), that is, the number of periods players have to wait before they can
change quantity. The game is set up such that collusion can be supported
as an equilibrium of the repeated game when ∆ = 2, but not when ∆
= 1 or ∆ = 3. This allows us to examine the empirical support for the
effect of (in)flexibility on the incidence of collusion in the laboratory. In
order to give it a fair chance, we use a simplified oligopoly game and allow
2Vives (2001) describes this result as ‘counterintuitive’. One might speculate, for
example, that it is possible to delay punishments until more convincing information
becomes available that the other player is really defecting. Such a strategy unravels
though since such a delay will strengthen the incentives of the other player to defect.
3Currently, the main IO and Antitrust textbooks present frequent interaction as a
facilitating factor independently of the information agents have access to; see e.g. See
Tirole (1988); Church and Ware (2000); Martin (2001); Ivaldi et al. (2003); Motta
(2004); Belleflamme and Peitz (2010).
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for learning by having subjects play seven repetitions of the indefinitely
repeated game.4
The results indicate that the current setup is very hostile to cooperation.
The incidence of collusion is low throughout and not significantly related to
flexibility. In order to examine whether this result may be due to coordina-
tion problems, we ran a second series of experiments in which subjects were
allowed to chat with each other at the beginning of the game. There is an
extensive literature, starting with Cooper et al. (1992), showing that com-
munication facilitates coordination. Our results confirm that collusion is
strongly fostered by communication in all treatments. Interestingly, when
subjects are allowed to communicate, we find that the incidence of collusion
is significantly higher in the treatment with intermediate flexibility than in
the treatments with low or high flexibility. Also, an analysis of the contents
of the chats attest to the behavioral relevance of the forces that underlie
the models of Abreu et al. (1991) and of Sannikov and Skrzypacz (2007).
Still, the effect of flexibility on collusion is only of second order importance
relative to the effect of communication.
To the best of our knowledge this is the first experimental analysis ad-
dressing the subtle but important effects of the frequency of interaction in
repeated games with imperfect monitoring. A number of recent experimen-
tal studies examine how cooperation is affected by imperfect monitoring per
se. Bereby-Meyer and Roth (2006) study how imperfect monitoring inter-
feres with learning, showing that it considerably reduces subjects’ ability to
learn to cooperate in repeated PD games (and to defect in one-shot ones).
Aoyagi and Fre´chette (2009) ask whether subjects’ ability to cooperate falls
when information becomes more noisy in a repeated game, finding signifi-
cant support for this theoretical prediction. Fudenberg et al. (2012) look
4Several experimental papers document strong learning effects in repeated game set-
tings (Selten and Stoecker, 1986; Camerer and Weigelt, 1988; Dal Bo` and Fre´chette,
2011).
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at the prevailing strategies in repeated games where subjects’ choices are
implemented with mistakes, highlighting the success of strategies that are
“lenient” (do not punish the first deviation) and “forgiving” (return to co-
operation after a short punishment phase).5 These studies indicate that
strategies and outcomes are significantly affected by the presence of imper-
fect monitoring. By contrast, we take imperfect monitoring as given, and
examine how it affects the comparative statics of a key structural variable.
A second novel feature of our design is the introduction of communi-
cation in a set-up characterized by imperfect monitoring. We are aware
of only one, more recent paper that also combines these features. Em-
brey, Fre´chette and Stacchetti (2014) studies the impact of renegotiation
concerns in a repeated partnership game allowing for structured commu-
nication at the beginning of every period to facilitate coordination. The
focus on action frequency and communication, on the other hand, relates
our paper to the recent work by Oprea, Charness, and Friedman (2014)
analyzing the impact of communication in continuous and discrete public
goods games, although under perfect monitoring.
1 Experimental Design
The design of our experiment aims at replicating Sannikov and Skrzypacz
(2007) [S&S]’s intriguing theoretical results in the simplest possible setting.
To do this, we adapt and further simplify their analysis of collusion in a
Cournot supergame.
5See also Cason and Khan (1999), who compare perfect monitoring with perfect
but delayed monitoring; and Feinberg and Snyder (2002) and Holcomb and Nelson
(1997), who study the effects of different types of imperfect but private monitoring on
cooperation.
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The Game
Two players interact repeatedly, in discrete time, in a Cournot market with
homogeneous products. Players simultaneously set quantities (q1t, q2t) and
the resulting price depends on total quantity (Qt = q1t+ q2t) and a random
shock (t). Specifically, price Pt in period t is given by:
Pt = a−Qt + t, t ∼ N(0, σ2)
Monitoring is imperfect because players receive information about each
period’s price Pt, but not about total quantity Qt or the random shock (t).
We restrict the action set to qit ∈ {3, 4}. We set a = 12 in the demand
function, marginal cost equal to 0, and per period fixed cost equal to 16.
Table 1 presents expected price and profits of the stage game that result
from this parameterization. Note that the expected profits are those of
a Prisoner’s Dilemma.6 Finally, we set the standard deviation of random
price equal to σ = 1.3.7
q2 q2
Price 3 units 4 units Profits 3 units 4 units
q1 3 units 6 5 q1 3 units 2, 2 -1, 4
4 units 5 4 4 units 4, -1 0, 0
Table 1: Expected price and expected profits of the stage game.
Prices and profits materialize in every period, but quantities can be ad-
justed only every ∆ periods. So, the quantities chosen in period t, together
with the random shocks, determine prices and profits for the following ∆
periods. A larger ∆ implies that it takes longer before players can react to
6A convenient feature is that the Nash and minmax payoff are the same. This makes
it easier to derive the best possible collusive outcomes.
7This implies, for example, that there is a probability of 44% that the realized price
will deviate by at least 1 unit from the expected price.
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a (bad) price signal, but also that when they react they will have observed
more signals about their opponent’s quantity choice.
In the model of S&S the game is infinitely repeated and players discount
future profits using a common interest rate r. The per-period discount
factor is then equal to δ = e−r∆. In the experiment we do not implement
discounting, but we implement a repeated game of indeterminate length:
at the end of every sequence of ∆ periods, a random draw determines
whether the game ends (with probability 1− δ), or continues for additional
∆ periods. (with probability δ). Under the assumption of risk neutrality,
this game is isomorphic to an infinitely repeated game where players can
change their actions every ∆ periods, and have a discount factor equal to
δ. Compared to other procedures implementing infinitely repeated games
with discounting, the random termination rule leads to behavior consistent
with the presence of dynamic incentives and to relatively high cooperation
rates (Fre´chette and Yuksel, 2014). We choose r = 0.10 so that we have
δ = e−r = 0.90 for ∆=1, δ = 0.82 for ∆=2, and δ = 0.74 for ∆=3. The
continuation probability decreases with ∆ but, conditional on the game
being continued, the number of additional periods increases with ∆. The
expected number of periods is ∆
1−δ , which is equal to 10, 11.1, and 11.5 for
∆ = 1, 2, and 3, respectively.
In the experiment we implement three treatments in which ∆ takes the
values 1, 2, and 3, respectively. A smaller value of ∆ (higher flexibility)
has two contrasting effects. One is that the discount factor is higher. This
implies that defection can be punished more effectively, which generates
the usual positive effect on collusion. A smaller value of ∆ also implies
that the players attain fewer noisy (price) signals about the other player’s
previous action before making the next choice. This has a negative impact
on the scope for collusion, since it generates a high rate of “false positives”.8
8Experiments on risk taking show that high decision flexibility may also generate
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The analysis of S&S implies that the interplay between these two effects
generates a non-monotonic effect of ∆. Collusion can be supported as an
equilibrium in the repeated game only for intermediate values of ∆. When
∆ is large the gains from defection are too attractive; when ∆ is small the
stochastic variation in prices erodes the gains from collusion by triggering
too frequent punishments. In Appendix A we outline how this result can be
derived. Applied to our game, assuming risk neutral payoff maximization,
collusion is sustainable when ∆ = 2, but not when ∆ = 1 or ∆ = 3. It is
this theoretical prediction that we explore in our experiment.
Procedure
The experiment was run in the CentERlab at Tilburg University.In total,
there were eighteen sessions, three for each treatment without communica-
tion, and three for each treatment with communication (see 2.1), with 16
subjects in each.9 Within each session, there were two matching groups of 8
subjects and subjects interacted only with other subjects in their matching
group. Subjects were recruited through an e-mail list of students interested
to participate in experiments. The experiment was computerized and pro-
grammed with zTree (Fischbacher, 2007). Interaction between subjects in
the experiment was anonymous.
Upon entering the lab, subjects were randomly seated at tables sepa-
rated by partitions. Written instructions were distributed and read aloud.
See Appendix B for a copy of the instructions, and Appendix C for the
screenshots of the program. Subjects were given ample time to study the
instructions at their own pace and to privately ask questions. A short quiz
was conducted to check their understanding.
a more myopic evaluation of outcomes (Gneezy and Potters, 1997). Because of the
discrete design the number of expected periods (and potential collusion profits) increases
slightly in ∆. This could also lead flexibility to affect negatively the amount of collusion,
although we believe the difference to be negligible.
9See Table D.1 in the online appendix D for further details on sessions and treatments.
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During the experiment profits were denoted in points; after the exper-
iment points were converted into cash at a rate of 8 points = 1 Euro. To
accommodate for potential losses, subjects were given a starting endow-
ment of 80 points. The random shocks on prices were generated by the
software at the beginning of each period.10 Sessions lasted on average one
hour and 45 minutes, including instructions and payment, and subjects
received an average payment of 21.5 Euro.1112
Subjects were randomly matched to one other subject to play the re-
peated game. Below we will refer to one play of the repeated game as a
match. In the first period of each match, subjects had to determine the
quantity (qit ∈ {3, 4}) they wanted to produce. Depending on the treat-
ment, quantities were fixed for the next ∆ periods. At the end of each
block of ∆ periods, subjects received information about the realized prices
and their own profits in the last ∆ periods. The random price shock was
drawn independently for each period from a normal distribution with zero
mean and standard deviation σ = 1.3. After each block of ∆ periods, there
was a probability δ that the game continued, and a probability 1− δ that
the game ended. When the game continued, subjects had to choose the
quantity for the next ∆ periods.
10The shocks were drawn independently across pairs, across periods, and across ses-
sions. We bounded the support for the price shocks, so as to prevent prices from going
negative. In theory, the probability that a shock realization makes the truncation rele-
vant is: 0.1% if both subjects defect; 0.006% if only one subject defects; 0.0002% if both
subjects cooperate. In practice in our experiment the price would have gone negative in
6 out of 11216 cases (0.053%).
11If subjects had played non-cooperatively throughout, they would have had zero
profits on average and earned only the starting endowment, amounting to 10 Euro.
Playing cooperatively throughout would earn them 29.4 Euro in total in expectation.
Playing the best cooperative equilibrium in ∆ = 2 would generate expected total earnings
of 23.8 Euro. This illustrates that the incentives to cooperate are substantial.
12A subject could in theory attain negative cumulative profits. The probability of
this happening when subjects always defect is 3%, but it is much lower when subjects
cooperate. In 17 out of 1680 matches, it occurred that a subject had a negative total
payoff at some point, and one subjects out of 240 ended the experiment with a negative
balance, thus earning nothing. The opposite possibility, that a subject would gain an
unreasonably high profit of above, say, 100 Euro, is negligible.
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When a game ended, a subject was rematched to a new subject to
play the repeated game anew. To facilitate this rematching, the realization
of the continuation probability was common across all pairs of subjects
in the same session. Rematching took place 6 times. So, each subject
played the indefinitely repeated game exactly 7 times, and this was common
knowledge. To exclude reputation building across matches, we adopted a
matching protocol that ensured that two subjects never interacted together
in more than one match.
We carefully explained the details of the game and the procedure to
the subjects. In particular, we took great care to explain the role of the
random price shocks, the random determination of the number of periods,
and the (re)matching procedure.
2 Results
Let us first focus on the treatments without communication. Our main
interest is in how the incidence of cooperation (collusion) varies across the
three treatments. We will use three different measures: the average coop-
eration rate across all periods in a match, the rate of cooperation in the
first period of a match, and the length of initial cooperation (i.e., the last
period in which a pair of players jointly decided to cooperate, before the
first defection of the match took place).13 Table 2 reports averages of these
measures over all matches. It is clear that the theoretical prediction is not
borne out by our experimental data. There are no signs that cooperation
is most prevalent in treatment ∆ = 2. Moreover, differences between treat-
ments are small for each of the three measures and never significant (with
Wilcoxon-Mann Whitney tests using the 6 matching groups per treatment
as observations).
13The length of initial cooperation is zero if at least one player defected in period 1.
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Table 2: Average cooperation frequencies, by treatment.
Treatment Cooperation rate Cooperation rate Length of initial
(all periods) (period 1) cooperation
∆ = 1 0.277 0.342 0.190
confidence intervals [0.226, 0.327] [0.284, 0.401] [0.100, 0.281]
∆ = 2 0.241 0.250 0.065
confidence intervals [0.200, 0.283] [0.200, 0.300] [0.017, 0.114]
∆ = 3 0.229 0.256 0.208
confidence intervals [0.191, 0.267] [0.195, 0.317] [0.059, 0.357]
Total 0.249 0.283 0.155
Notes: 95% confidence intervals, one observation per matching group, per match.
However, we know that aggregate comparisons may not tell the com-
plete story because learning effects are often very important in non-trivial
experimental settings (Selten and Stoeker, 1986; Camerer and Weigelt,
1988; Roth and Erev, 1995; Dal Bo` and Freche´tte, 2011; and Bigoni et
al. 2014). We also know that the presence of imperfect monitoring may
make learning even more difficult in set ups similar to ours (Bereby Meyer
and Roth, 2006). The positive effect of flexibility on the sustainability of
collusion is more intuitive than the negative one and less related to the in-
formation structure. We therefore expect that subjects need to gain more
experience with the game before the negative effect displays its force, rather
than for the positive one to act.
Figure 1 presents the development of the three measures of cooperation
over the matches for each of the three treatments. The first panel gives
average rates of cooperation across all periods of a match; the second panel
displays the average rates of cooperation in the first period of each match;
the third panel depicts the development of the length of initial cooperation.
These figures confirm that, despite some differences in the initial coopera-
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Figure 1: Measures of cooperation, across matches. Without communica-
tion.
tion rates across treatments in the first match, subjects’ behavior tends to
converge to very low levels of cooperation in all three treatments, and no
relevant differences emerge. This impression is corroborated by the results
of multivariate regressions which control for the number of the match (1
to 7) and the length of a match (which varies from 1 to 50 periods), which
are presented in Table 3.
One would be tempted to interpret these results as a rejection of the
theoretical predictions. However, we are dealing with infinitely repeated
games where, in treatments where cooperation is sustainable in equilib-
rium, non-cooperation remains an equilibrium. Is the failure to cooper-
ate/collude possibly due to a coordination problem? Subjects may simply
have failed to coordinate in treatment ∆ = 2. This would not imply a
failure of the theory, which is about the existence of cooperative equilibria,
not about subjects’ ability to coordinate on them. An alternative explana-
tion is that subjects adopt strategies that are fundamentally different from
those predicted by the theory, which relies on the hypothesis that players
play according to Grim Trigger. To test whether this is the case, we studied
how subjects react to the observed signals. In a panel logit regression with
fixed effects at the subject level, we estimate the impact of the average
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Table 3: Regression on initial and average cooperation.
Cooperation Cooperation Length initial
period 1 all periods cooperation
M.E. (S.E.) M.E. (S.E.) Coeff. (S.E.)
Match -0.029*** (0.008) -0.025*** (0.006) -0.399** (0.165)
∆ = 1 0.092 (0.063) 0.010 (0.048) 1.464 (1.247)
∆ = 3 0.006 (0.077) -0.018 (0.048) 0.961 (1.528)
Match’s length -0.004*** (0.001) -0.020 (0.018)
Constant -4.097*** (1.265)
N. of observations 1008 1008 504
Notes: results for period 1 are obtained via a logit regression, and results for all periods
via a generalized linear model with binomial distribution and logit link function; for both
regressions we report the marginal effects. Results for the length of initial cooperation
are obtained via a tobit regression left-censored by 0. In the first two regressions, we use
one observation per subject, per match; in the third regression we use one observation
per duopoly, per match; standard errors clustered by matching group in parentheses;
symbols *,**,*** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
price observed over the past ∆ periods on a subject’s choice to cooperate
in the current period, conditional on the subject’s action in the previous
∆ periods. Results – reported in Table D.2 in Appendix D – suggest that
in fact subjects stop cooperation when they observe a low price, and do
not revert to cooperation when they are defecting and observe a high price.
Figure D.1 in Appendix D further corroborates this view.
In light of these findings, we move to explore the conjecture that sub-
jects do not cooperate in the ∆ = 2 treatment because of a coordination
issue. We hypothesize that, if we facilitate coordination among agents, then
cooperation rates should go up in ∆ = 2 where collusion is an equilibrium,
but not (or at least not as much) in the other treatments.
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2.1 Communication
To tackle the coordination problem, we ran additional treatments with the
exact same design as before but in which subjects could now communicate
at the beginning of each supergame. In particular, we ran nine additional
sessions with pre-play communication, three sessions for each of the three
different levels of flexibility constituting our treatments, ∆ = 1, 2, 3. In
these new treatments, at the beginning of each repeated game a chat win-
dow opened and paired subjects could send text messages to each other for
2 minutes in free form (in English, anonymous, not offensive).When the 2
minutes expired, the chat window disappeared and subjects interacted for a
sequence of periods, without any further possibility to exchange messages.
Table 4: Average cooperation frequencies. Treatments with communica-
tion.
Treatment Cooperation rate Cooperation rate Length of initial
(all periods) (period 1) cooperation
∆ = 1 0.701 0.893 2.923
confidence intervals [0.644, 0.758] [0.855, 0.931] [2.216, 3.630]
∆ = 2 0.739 0.857 5.869
confidence intervals [0.688, 0.791] [0.811, 0.903] [4.043, 7.695]
∆ = 3 0.660 0.786 3.095
confidence intervals [0.604, 0.717] [0.746, 0.825] [2.377, 3.814]
Total 0.712 0.838 4.048
Notes: 95% confidence intervals, one observation per matching group, per match.
Table 4 reports the aggregate cooperation data for the three new treat-
ments with communication. First, in line with the previous literature (e.g.
Fonseca and Normann, 2012; Cooper and Kuhn, 2014), it reveals that
pre-play communication has an enormous impact on subjects’ ability to
cooperate. Average cooperation rates, for instance, increase from around
15
25% without communication (column 1, Table 2), to some 70% with com-
munication (column 1, Table 4). The size of this effect appears even larger
than typically observed in previous studies with perfect monitoring. Sec-
ond, average cooperation rates and first period cooperation still offer little
support for S&S’s theoretical prediction. Even though the incidence of co-
operation is slightly higher in the treatment with ∆ = 2, there appear to
be no significant differences across the three treatments (with Wilcoxon-
Mann-Whitney tests using the 6 matching groups per treatment as obser-
vations). On the other hand, initial cooperation lasts significantly longer
with ∆ = 2 than under the other two treatments (Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney
tests, N1 =N2 = 6, p-value = 0.016 for the comparison between ∆ = 1 and
∆ = 2, and p-value= 0.025 for the comparison between ∆ = 2 and ∆ = 3).
Figure 2 presents the development over the matches of the average rate
of cooperation, cooperation rate in period 1, and the length of initial co-
operation. The pictures reinforce the impression given by Table 4 that the
length of initial cooperation is quite a bit longer in treatment ∆ = 2 than
in ∆ = 1 and ∆ = 3, but that cooperation rates hardly differ between
treatments.
Figure 2: Measures of cooperation, across matches. With communication.
To attain further insights into these results, we ran a logit regression on
cooperation in period 1 of each match, a glm regression on the individual
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cooperation rate in each match, and tobit regressions for the length of
initial cooperation, in the same vein as we did for the treatments without
communication. Results are presented in Table 5.
Table 5: Regression on initial and average cooperation.
Cooperation Cooperation Length initial
period 1 all periods cooperation
M.E. (S.E.) M.E. (S.E.) Coeff. (S.E.)
Match -0.010 (0.007) 0.006 (0.005) -0.080 (0.192)
∆ = 1 0.036 (0.058) -0.110** (0.055) -1.306 (1.285)
∆ = 3 -0.071 (0.060) -0.132*** (0.045) -2.385* (1.432)
Match’s length -0.007*** (0.001) 0.203*** (0.061)
Constant 1.474 (1.354)
N. of observations 1008 1008 504
Notes: results for period 1 are obtained via a logit regression, and results for all periods
via a generalized linear model with binomial distribution and logit link function; for both
regressions we report the marginal effects. Results for the length of initial cooperation
are obtained via a tobit regression left-censored by 0. In the first two regressions, we use
one observation per subject, per match; in the third regression we use one observation
per duopoly, per match; standard errors clustered by matching group in parentheses;
symbols *,**,*** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
Table 5 reveals that cooperation rates in period 1 are not significantly
different across treatments. The picture changes for cooperation beyond
the first period. Once we control for the length to the match, the average
cooperation rate across all periods is significantly higher in ∆ = 2 than in
the other two treatments.14 The length of initial cooperation is also sig-
14Controlling for the length of the match makes quite a difference. By chance, matches
were substantially longer in treatment ∆ = 2 than in the other two treatments, which
suppressed average cooperation rates. At the same time, the length of a match has a
positive effect on the length of initial cooperation. If a match ends early, any ongoing
cooperation by necessity also ends. A concern one might have is that subjects overesti-
mate the long term prospects of cooperation in treatment ∆=2 if they are experiencing
relatively long matches in this treatment. To check for such an effect we add the length
of the previous match as a regressor to the regressions in Table 5. This regressor is never
significant though, and it only marginally affects the coefficients for ∆=1 and ∆=3.
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nificantly larger in treatment ∆ = 2 than in treatment ∆ = 3, while the
difference between treatments ∆ = 2 and ∆ = 1 turns out not to be sta-
tistically significant. The general picture that emerges from these data is
that, once coordination problems are solved by the possibility to communi-
cate, cooperation beyond the first periods is significantly more prevalent in
the intermediate treatment where cooperation is an equilibrium, consistent
with the theoretical prediction.15
To explore further the nature of this effect, we turn to the analysis of
communication content.
2.2 Content analysis
The striking increase in cooperation rates that we observe in all three treat-
ments suggests that communication does not only alleviate coordination
problems in ∆ = 2, allowing subjects to cooperate more in that treatment
as predicted by theory. Communication also seems to enable subjects to
circumvent the forces that do not allow to sustain cooperation in equilib-
rium in the other two treatments. It appears able to induce subjects not
to react too quickly to noisy negative signals in ∆ = 1, and to resist the
temptation to defect when ∆ = 3. Is this reflected in the chats?
To answer this question we coded the content of the chats. Since we had
9 sessions with 7 matches in each, and 8 pairs in each match, we have 504
chats to code, with 14 lines per chat on average. We hired two graduate
students, one in Tilburg and one in Rome, and let them code the chats in-
dependently after giving them the same written coding instructions (which
are reported in the online Appendix E). Coders were asked to classify each
15In Table D.3 and Figure D.2 in Appendix D we replicate the analysis of subjects’
reaction to observed signals, conditional on their past action. Similar to what we ob-
served in the treatments without communication, subjects tend to switch to defection
when they observe low prices. However, they are more forgiving, in the sense that the
fraction of subjects who switch back from defection to cooperation tends to be higher
than without communication, regardless of the observed signal.
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chat without knowing which treatment it belonged to. We code the chats
in terms of presence/absence of five non-exclusive types of content:
Agreement: Messages confirming having reached an agreement/coordination
on how to play the ensuing supergame.
Example:16 “(3,3): DDDDDDD”, “ok”
Appeal: Appeals to the partner’s trustworthiness or the request for a
promise to play cooperatively.
Example: “Are u a good guy?”
Promise: Promises to be trustworthy or to play cooperatively.
Example: “hah you can believe me”
Threat: Messages containing threats or forecasts of a punishment phase
following non-cooperation, subdivided in: forgiving threats, and un-
forgiving threats.
Examples: “I will blame for the shock if the price is out of expectation
for once. It it is abnormal for two periods continually I will produce
4 for 3 periods and then back to 3.” (forgiving)
“once you do that I will chose 4 every period so better keep to 3 every
time best for both of us” (unforgiving)
Leniency: Discussions, requests or promises of lenient behavior, in terms
of waiting for more/better information before punishing a low price
realization.
Example: “if you get a loss its the shock not me”
We checked inter-coder agreement using Cohen’s kappa. Aggregating across
all message types kappa is equal to 0.771. For each message type sepa-
rately the values of kappa are somewhat lower: 0.607 (Agreement), 0.602
16The reported excerpts are taken from the subjects’ communications, as classified by
the coders.
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(Appeal), 0.644 (Promise), 0.588 (Threat), and 0.679 (Leniency). This is
generally considered to be a good inter-coder agreement. In the analysis
below we assign a chat to a certain category if at least one coder did so.
Requiring assignment by both coders would reduce the frequency of certain
categories (in particular Leniency) and impair the power of the analysis.
Table 6 reports the frequency of the different classes of messages in the
three treatments.17
The coordination function of communication emerges as very impor-
tant in all three treatments, as more than 90% of the chats contain Agree-
ment/coordination type messages; however, the data reveal that this type
of messages is significantly more frequent in the ∆ = 2 treatment. Inter-
estingly, both Threats, and Leniency messages are more frequently used
in ∆ = 1, the treatment in which false-positives are predicted to erode
cooperation. Indeed, if players could commit to be lenient and wait for ad-
ditional information they could solve this problem and make cooperation
sustainable.
Table 6: Frequency of messages by treatment.
∆ = 1 ∆ = 2 ∆ = 3 significant differences
Agreement 91.1% 94.6% 92.9% 1 < 2, 2 > 3
Appeal 23.2% 29.2% 38.7% ·
Promise 35.1% 30.4% 32.7% ·
Threat 39.9% 20.8% 19.0% 1 > 2, 1 > 3
Leniency 18.5% 9.5% 4.8% 1 > 2, 1 > 3
Notes: category assigned if at least one coder did so; comparisons based on one-sided
Mann-Whitney Wilcoxon tests, using one observation per matching group, i.e. six ob-
servations per treatment; all the emphasized differences are significant at the 10% level.
Table 7 presents the results of regressing the length of initial coop-
eration in a match on the use of different types of messages. The table
17The online Appendix F contains some sample chats to give an impression of how
subjects used the opportunity to communicate.
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illustrates that particular messages are significantly related to the length
of cooperation. We performed similar regression analyses using coopera-
tion in the first period and the average rate of cooperation as dependent
variables, and obtained quite consistent results. Agreements and promises
are strongly associated with cooperation in all treatments, while messages
discussing Leniency are most strongly related to cooperation rates in those
treatments where the frequency of interaction is relatively high (∆ = 1 and
∆ = 2).18 Taken together, these results suggest that many subjects appre-
ciate the main strategic forces that may erode cooperation in the different
treatments as highlighted by the theory.
Table 7: Effects of communication on the length of initial cooperation.
∆ = 1 ∆ = 2 ∆ = 3
Coeff. (S.E.) Coeff. (S.E.) Coeff. (S.E.)
Agreement 3.351*** (0.924) 12.358*** (1.242) 4.016** (1.585)
Appeal -0.927 (1.511) -0.773 (1.868) -0.210 (0.734)
Promise 1.523*** (0.436) 5.055** (2.096) 3.078*** (0.884)
Threat 0.517 (0.533) -1.653 (2.136) -0.157 (1.405)
Leniency 1.630** (0.679) 8.222*** (2.369) -2.000 (1.503)
Match 0.088 (0.236) -0.338 (0.325) -0.681** (0.294)
Match’s length 0.171*** (0.066) 0.250*** (0.087) 0.145*** (0.038)
Constant -3.575 (2.226) -12.351*** (2.333) -1.612 (1.544)
N. of observations 168 168 168
Notes: tobit regression; one observation per pair, per match; standard errors clustered
by matching group in parentheses; symbols *,**,*** indicate significance at 10%, 5%,
and 1%, respectively.
18A tobit regression pooling data from the three treatments together reveals that the
effects of “Agreements” and “Leniency” are significantly smaller in ∆ = 1 and in ∆ = 3
than in ∆ = 2. Regression results are available from the authors, upon request.
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3 Discussion and conclusions
We investigate the behavioral relevance of the argument, pointed out by
Abreu et al. (1991) and Sannikov and Skrzypacz (2007), that incentives to
cooperate may be eroded by the ability (necessity) to respond quickly to
noisy information about other players’ actions.
The interaction between the positive effect of flexibility on cooperation
due to reduced gains from deviation and the negative effect linked to im-
perfect monitoring and mistakes, should generate a non-linear relationship.
To test this prediction we implement, in the laboratory, an indefinitely re-
peated Cournot game with noisy price information similar to one of the
models in Sannikov and Skrzypacz (2007), and vary how long players have
to wait before changing output. In a first set of treatments we find that the
theoretical prediction is not supported by the data they generate: subjects
converge rapidly to very low levels of cooperation in all treatments.
This result does not support the theory, but cannot reject it either be-
cause in the intermediate flexibility treatment, where collusion is sustain-
able in equilibrium, many other equilibria exist. To understand whether co-
ordination was the problem, we implement an additional set of treatments
where, before the oligopoly supergames starts, subjects can communicate
by exchanging text messages in free form for two minutes.
The first finding from this new set of treatments is a striking and gen-
eral effect of communication: collusion rates increase three-folds in all three
treatments, and the increase persists across supergames. This finding con-
firms and extends previous results on communication and cooperation to an
imperfect monitoring environment. It suggests that communication does
more than facilitating coordination. It also allows subjects to overcome
the main problems that do not allow to support collusion in equilibrium in
other treatments: noisy signals with high flexibility and large gains from
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defection with low flexibility.
Second, with communication collusion seems to be easier to sustain in
the intermediate flexibility treatment. In other words, a non-linear relation
between flexibility and collusion, albeit small, does emerge once commu-
nication is introduced. This suggests that the subtle interaction between
flexibility and imperfect monitoring identified by theory is behaviorally
relevant, although its effects are of second order relative to those of com-
munication.
An analysis of the content of subjects’ communication reveals a posi-
tive correlation between the frequency of other arguments subjects discuss
and the main mechanism that makes collusion problematic in each treat-
ment. In particular, we find that communication about lenient behavior,
in terms of waiting for more signals before starting punishing after a low
price realization, are significantly more frequent, and are positively related
to collusion rates in the high flexibility treatments, i.e. in those treatments
where too fast reaction to noisy information is the main problem hindering
cooperation.
Our results suggest that we may want to be more nuanced in treating
the frequency of interaction as a facilitating factor for collusion in markets
where monitoring is imperfect and frequent. They also extend to imperfect
monitoring experimental findings on the importance of communication for
collusion under perfect monitoring, most recently in Fonseca and Normann
(2012), and Cooper and Kuhn (2014), supporting the current antitrust
practice of addressing explicit cartels (involving communication) but not
tacit collusion.
Several avenues for further experimental research suggest themselves.
In our design, cooperation is an equilibrium only with intermediate flexi-
bility. Still, it could be that the incentives to cooperate do not vary enough
across the different treatments to pick up strong effects. In future work, one
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could increase the incentive differences by pulling the flexibility treatments
further apart, although this would make the experiment more difficult to
implement because the continuation probabilities (δ) would also vary more
widely. In addition, our design varies decision flexibility and communica-
tion opportunities, while keeping the rate of information feedback constant.
An alternative design would be to keep action flexibility fixed, while varying
the frequency of information arrival. It would be interesting to see whether
such an alternative design would produce similar results, in the sense that
cooperation is hindered both when information arrives very frequently and
when the information lag is large (Abreu et al., 1991). It would be also im-
portant from the policy point of view to test the robustness of the results to
environments with more firms and/or more frequent communication within
a supergame. Another variation would be to implement different types of
noisy information signals. Whereas Sannikov and Skrzypacz (2007) focus
on information which arrives continuously without shocks, another relevant
environment is where signals arrive discontinuously (at a Poisson rate). A
testable prediction is that the impact of flexibility on cooperation will de-
pend on the type of signal (Abreu et al., 1991). High flexibility is more
harmful if the arrival rate of a signal is increasing in the rate of cooperation
(the ‘good news’ case) than in case the arrival rate of a signal is decreasing
in the rate of cooperation (the ‘bad news’ case).
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Appendices
A Theoretical analysis
In this Appendix we outline how the non-monotonic effect of flexibility (∆)
on the sustainability of collusion is derived. The sustainability of collusion
depends on the punishment strategy adopted by the players. Nonetheless,
the authors prove that it is possible to compute a robust lower bound by
finding the best symmetric equilibrium with Nash reversion as a punish-
ment, and a robust upper bound by finding the best symmetric equilibrium
with the minimax payoff of 0 as a punishment. Both bounds are valid for
both symmetric and asymmetric equilibria. With our parameters, the up-
per and the lower bound coincide, as the Nash equilibrium profit coincides
with the minimax payoff in our game (both are equal to zero).
We can follow Sannikov and Skrzypacz (2007) to show that in our set
up collusion ( qi = 3) can be sustained when ∆ = 2, but not when ∆ = 1 or
∆ = 3. From Abreu et al. (1986) we know that the best strongly-symmetric
equilibrium payoff of this game can be achieved by the following strategy
profile:
• Players start in the collusive state and choose quantities qC , qC (for
us it will be (3, 3)).
• As long as the realized price is in region P+, players remain in the
collusive state. If the price is outside this region, they move to the
punishment state forever after.
• Because in our game mini-max has the same payoffs as the static
Nash equilibrium, in an optimal equilibrium once the players reach
the punishment state they play (4, 4) forever.
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We now characterize the region P+ and it’s complement P . Let G (Q)
be the probability that the price will be in P+, and V the expected profit
of the collusive equilibrium. Each player’s IC constraint is:
pi (qD, qC) (1− δ) + δ {V ∗G (qD + qC) + 0 ∗ [1−G (qD + qC)]} ≤
pi (qC , qC) (1− δ) + δ {V ∗G (2qC) + 0 ∗ [1−G (2qC)]} , (1)
which can be re-written as:
δV [G (2qC)−G (qD + qC)]− (1− δ) [pi (qD, qC)− pi (qC , qC)] ≥ 0. (2)
If the IC constraints are satisfied, then the expected profit in this equilib-
rium is:
V = (1− δ) pi (qC , qC) + δ [V G (2qC) + 0 ∗ (1−G (2qC))] ,
which yields:
V = pi (qC , qC)
1− δ
1− δG (2qC) .
Note that V is decreasing in δ and increasing in G(2qC).
Sannikov and Skrzypacz (2007) show that the optimal P+ region (that
maximizes V ) corresponds is a tail test. There is a cutoff pˆ such that above
pˆ are in P+ and prices below are in P .
If a tail test is adopted, then
G(Q) =
∫ ∞
pˆ
φ
[
p(Q),
σ2
∆
, p
]
dp,
where φ(µ, σ2, x) is the probability density function of a normal distribution
with mean µ and variance σ2, evaluated at x. Using the parametrization
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in our experiment, with p(Q) = 12 − q1 − q2 and σ = 1.3, we can rewrite
the IC-constraint as a function of pˆ and calculate when it can be satisfied
at different levels of ∆.
Numerical calculations show that the left-hand side of the IC-constraint
(2) is convex, and that when ∆ = 2 it is positive for cutoff prices pˆ ∈
[4.758, 5.060], while it takes negative values for any pˆ ≥ 0 when ∆ = 1 or
∆ = 3.
This implies that in the infinite horizon Cournot duopoly game with
imperfect public monitoring collusion is sustainable in equilibrium when
∆ = 2, while no collusive equilibrium is sustainable when ∆ = 1 or ∆ = 3.
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B Instructions
(for on-line publication)
In this Appendix, we report the experimental instructions for the treat-
ment with ∆ = 3. Instructions for the other two treatments only change
where strictly necessary, and are available from the authors upon request.
Welcome to our experiment. Please follow the instructions carefully.
During the experiment your earnings are denoted in points. At the begin-
ning of the experiment you will receive an initial endowment of 80 points.
In addition, you will make decisions that can make you earn or lose points.
The number of points you earn depends on your decisions, the decisions of
other participants, and chance. At the end, we will exchange your points
into Euro according a conversion rate of 1 point = 12.5 Eurocent, which
means that 8 points = 1 Euro. You will receive your payment privately at
the end of the experiment. We guarantee anonymity with respect to other
participants and we do not record any information connecting your name
to your decisions or earnings.
Please be quiet during the entire experiment and do not talk to your
neighbors. If you have a question please raise your hand and you will be
answered privately.
Your task
Production:
You will make decisions for a firm in this experiment. For a number of
periods you have to determine the quantity that your firm will produce.
You can decide to produce a low level of 3 units or a high level of 4 units.
Your firm operates in a market with one other firm. In each period, your
profits (in points) will depend on the number of units you produce and the
number of units produced by other firm. The decisions for this firm will
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be made by another participant. You cannot know who this participant
is, nor can this participant know who you are. We will refer to this other
participant as “the other firm”. We will now explain how your profits
depend on the number of units you produce and the number of units the
other firm produces.
Costs:
Production involves costs. Every period, you have to pay a fixed cost of 16
points. These costs are independent of whether you produce 3 units or 4
units.
Price:
The market price in a period is the same for your firm and the other firm.
The market price depends on the total production in a period. The total
production is the sum of the number of units you produce, and the number
of units produced by the other firm. The larger total production, the lower
the market price. The expected market price is as follows:
Expected price = 12−(number of units you produce)−(number of units other
firm produces)
For convenience the following table summarizes how the expected market
price depends on the number of units produced by your firm and the other
firm.
Expected price Production of other firm
3 units 4 units
Your production 3 units 6 5
4 units 5 4
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Profit:
Each period, your profits are equal to your revenue minus your cost, where
your revenue is equal to the number of units you produce multiplied by the
market price. Hence, your profit is:
Expected profit = Expected price * (number of units you produce) − 16
Recall that the price depends on your production and the production of the
other firm. For convenience, the table below calculates how your expected
profit and the expected profit of the other firm depend on your production
and the production of the other firm. The first entry in each cell represents
your profit, while the second entry (in gray) represents the profit of the
other firm.
Expected profits Production of other firm
3 units 4 units
Your production 3 units 2, 2 -1, 4
4 units 4, -1 0, 0
For example, you can read in the table that if in a period you produce
3 units and the other firm produces 3 units, your expected profit will be
equal to 2. You can check this as follows:
• Expected price = 12 − 3 − 3 = 6
• Expected profit = 6 * 3 − 16 = 2
You can also read in the table that if you produce 4 units and the other
firm produces 4 units, your expected profit will be equal to 0. You can
check this as follows:
• Expected price = 12 − 4 − 4 = 4
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• Expected profit = 4 * 4 − 16 = 0
Note that profit can be negative. In the unlikely event, that the total
amount of points you earn in the experiment is lower than 0, you will not
receive any money, but you will not have to pay any money either.
Price shocks: You may have noted that until now, we have talked about
the expected price and expected profits. Due to unobservable variations
in demand, the market price in a period is affected by a random shock.
Specifically, the market price is the expected price plus the shock:
Price = 12−(number of units you produce)−(number of units other firm
produces)+ shock
The price shock in one period is independent of the price shock in another
period. The shock in each period is normally distributed with a mean of
zero and a standard deviation of 1.3. This means that the shock is equally
likely to be positive or negative. The probability that the shock attains a
value in a certain range is summarized in the following table.
Range of shock values below -1 -1 to 0 0 to 1 above 1
Probability 22% 28% 28% 22%
Since the mean value of the shock is zero, the expected price and the
expected profit depend on the number of units produced by you and the
other firm, as indicated in the tables above. The actual price and the actual
profit, however, will differ as a result of the shock. For example, if your
firm produces 3 units, and the other firm produces 3 units, the price will
be equal to 12-3-3+shock = 6+shock, which means that the price will be
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• below 5 with probability 22%
• between 5 and 6 with probability 28%
• between 6 and 7 with probability 28%
• above 7 with probability 22%.
Now suppose the actual price shock is −0.5. Then the actual price will
be 6 −0.5= 5.5 and your actual profit will be 5.5 * 3 − 16 = 0.5, while
your expected profit was 2. Therefore, the price depends on the number
of units produced by you, the number of units produced by the other firm,
and the shock as follows:
Price Production of other firm
3 units 4 units
Your production 3 units 6 + shock 5 + shock
4 units 5 + shock 4 + shock
By reducing the price a negative price shock also reduces your revenue
and your profits. Conversely, a positive price shock increases your revenue
and your profit. Your profits will then be:
Profit = (expected price + shock) * (number of units you produce) − 16
It is important to realize that you have no influence whatsoever on the
price shock. It is truly random. The number of units produced by you and
the other firm affect the expected price, which will be higher the lower is
the total production. But the actual price is also affected by the random
price shock.
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Periods and markets
• You will be randomly paired to another participant for a sequence of
periods, referred to as a market. This other participant will make the
decisions for the other firm.
• During the whole experiment you will participate in a total of 7 mar-
kets.
• In these 7 markets you will be paired to another participant at most
once.
• Every 3 periods you will have to decide how many units your firm
produces in each period. This means that you will not be able to
change the number of units you produce every period, but only once
every 3 periods. The same holds for the other producer.
• How many periods a market will last is randomly determined. Each
time three periods have been completed, the computer will randomly
draw a number between 1 and 100. If the number is below or equal
to 74, the market will continue for another three periods. Hence, the
probability that the market continues with the same participant for
at least three more periods is 74%. If the number is above 74, a new
market will start in which you will be randomly paired to another
participant; unless you have already participated in 7 markets in
which case the experiment will end.
Information
At the end of each period you will be informed about the number of units
you produced, the price and your profits. For the periods in which you do
not make a decision, this information is shown only shortly. After every
block of three periods, you will also receive information on the average price
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and your average profits for the last three periods. Information from all
previous periods is presented in the so-called History Table in lower part
of your screen.
It is important to note that you do not receive information on the
number of units produced by the other firm. You do get information on
the market price, but because of the random price shock you cannot infer
exactly how many units the other firm produced, nor how much profit the
other firm made. Still, the price does give you some imperfect indication
about the number of units produced by the other firm.
On the top left of the screen you can see how many points you have
earned until now in the current market, and in the top right you can see
how many points you have earned during the whole experiment, including
the initial endowment of 80 points.
Summary
1. You decide how many units you wish to produce in the next three
periods.
2. The number of units you produce, the number of units the other firm
produces, and the price shock determine your profit in a period.
3. You are paired to one other participant for a sequence of periods,
called a market.
4. After each block of three periods, there is a probability of 74% that
you remain paired to the same participant for another three periods
and a probability of 26% that the present market ends.
5. If a market ends you will be randomly paired to another participant
and new market will start, until you have participated in 7 markets
in total.
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6. The total profits you accumulate over all markets, together with the
starting endowment of 80 points determine your earnings for the ex-
periment. 8 points will be converted into 1 Euro.
Procedure and questions
You are now given some time to study the instructions on your own and
to ask clarifying questions (if any). After that, you will be asked to answer
a few control questions to check your understanding. The first market will
start as soon as all the participants have correctly answered the control
questions.
Please be reminded that you are not allowed to talk or communicate to
other participants during the experiment. If you have a question, please
raise your hand and I will come to your table.
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C Graphical interface
(for on-line publication)
Figure C.1: Screenshot of the choice stage.
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Figure C.2: Screenshot of the results stage.
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D Additional tables and graphs
(for on-line publication)
Communication Delta Date Average Payment Average match length
No 1 04/03/09 13.6 5.9
05/03/09 17.8 9.9
11/10/12 17.1 11.4
2 02/03/09 18.1 14.7
05/03/09 17.7 9.3
11/10/12 18.8 20.4
3 04/03/09 16.6 9.6
05/03/09 16.1 12.6
10/10/12 17.8 19.4
Yes 1 22/05/13 17.9 8.3
29/05/13 21.6 10.7
23/11/17 23.4 10.9
2 22/05/13 35.9 22.7
29/05/13 30.8 14.4
23/11/17 25.2 15.3
3 22/05/13 21.9 7.0
29/05/13 24.8 10.4
23/11/17 25.6 18.1
Table D.1: Sessions details.
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Figure D.1: Average cooperation rate, conditional on past signal and ac-
tion. Treatments without communication.
Figure D.2: Average cooperation rate, conditional on past signal and ac-
tion. Treatments with communication.
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∆ = 1 ∆ = 2 ∆ = 3
Coopt−1 -0.258*** (0.046) -0.374*** (0.067) -0.365*** (0.118)
Pricet−1×Coopt−1 0.102*** (0.022) 0.132*** (0.028) 0.200*** (0.058)
Pricet−1×Deft−1 -0.032*** (0.009) -0.032* (0.017) -0.087*** (0.020)
Match -0.024*** (0.005) -0.023*** (0.006) -0.007 (0.010)
Period in match -0.010*** (0.002) -0.005 (0.003) -0.007 (0.007)
N. of observations 2597 2041 1193
Notes: Marginal effects from a panel logit regression with fixed effects at the subject
level. One observation per subject, per ∆ periods. Symbols *,**,*** indicate
significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
Table D.2: Cooperation depending on past signals and actions. Treatments
without communication.
∆ = 1 ∆ = 2 ∆ = 3
Coopt−1 -0.270*** (0.081) -0.186** (0.091) -0.826*** (0.096)
Pricet−1×Coopt−1 0.064*** (0.006) 0.028*** (0.007) 0.077** (0.034)
Pricet−1×Deft−1 0.007 (0.006) 0.006** (0.003) -0.004 (0.012)
Match 0.014*** (0.003) 0.004*** (0.001) -0.003 (0.004)
Period in match -0.008*** (0.002) -0.002** (0.001) -0.005 (0.004)
N. of observations 3008 2577 984
Notes: Marginal effects from a panel logit regression with fixed effects at the subject
level. One observation per subject, per ∆ periods. Symbols *,**,*** indicate
significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
Table D.3: Cooperation depending on past signals and actions. Treatments
with communication.
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E Coding instructions
(for on-line publication)
Your task is to classify or “code” the messages exchanged through a
computerized chat system by subjects that participated to a laboratory
experiment. The experiment was designed to study how perturbed/noisy
information, the ability to react fast to the choices of a partner/opponent,
and the possibility to communicate affect subjects ability to sustain coop-
erative behavior (in experimental oligopoly games).
Flexibility, the ability to react swiftly to others’ choices, is commonly
seen as a factor that facilitates cooperation. The intuitive logic behind this
belief is that flexibility reduces gains from cheating on the promise to coop-
erate by drawing the punishment/reaction of the cheated opponent nearer.
Though appealing and intuitive, this established role of flexibility may have
negative effects on cooperation where there is only imperfect monitoring of
each others actions, so that each subject is not certain whether the part-
ner/opponent cheated or some random shock determined the bad outcome.
The reason is that when there is imperfect information that arrives fre-
quently, high flexibility may induce players to react to bad news’ too early,
when they are still very imprecise, rather than waiting for more informa-
tion before reacting. This generates many costly mistakes which erode the
value of cooperation and the ability to sustain it.
To test the empirical relevance of these different effects we implemented
in the laboratory an indefinitely repeated quantity-setting duopoly game
with imperfect monitoring. Subjects played a game (that is described in
the enclosed instructions) in pairs. They played this game several times,
and each time they were matched randomly and anonymously with one of
the other subjects. In this game, subjects could choose the quantities they
produce and thereby influence the market price, which was determined by
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the sum of both subjects’ output. Choosing to produce a high quantity,
4, led to larger individual sales, but depressed the market price for both
players. Therefore, subjects could prefer to cooperate and both choose low
output, 3, so that prices stay high and both subjects gain higher profits.
Of course, if one subject chose to cooperate keeping output low, producing
3, the other could cheat instead of cooperating, choosing a larger output,
4, and earning a higher individual profit by exploiting the first subjects
cooperative attempt to keep the price high by producing only 3. That is,
cooperating by choosing low output 3 could be exploited by the opponent
who could cheat by choosing the high production level 4 hoping not to be
detected because of the imperfect monitoring.
As mentioned, cheating could go undetected because the market price
was not only affected by the quantities, it was also influenced by an un-
observable random shock that made it difficult to understand if in the
previous period the partner chose to cooperate (i.e. to keep output low,
at 3, so that the market price stayed high) or chose instead to cheat and
make more by producing high output 4 while the other cooperated pro-
ducing only 3. Subjects could not observe each other’s quantity choices;
they only observed price which is a noisy signal of total quantity, so they
could never be completely sure that a low price was due only to bad luck or
also to the opponent failing to cooperate. But of course if the price stayed
consistently very low for many period it was more likely that the opponent
was producing high quantity. Across treatments we varied the number of
periods players have to wait before they can change quantity.
Crucially, at the beginning of each oligopoly games (in the treatments
that you will code), subjects could also communicate in a chat. We are
interested in understanding what type of messages they exchanged in the
different chats, and whether the typical messages change across treatments
with different levels of flexibility. Your task is to categorize the content of
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these chat messages in the way explained below.
The next page reports detailed guidelines (Coder guidelines) on how to
code the chat messages. The attached excel file contains the chats and the
columns on the right side that you will need for the coding. The guidelines
should (hopefully) become much clearer if you read them again after you
have looked at some of the chats.
Once you start coding, you will understand better how to code, and you
may realize that some of the earlier code were not exactly how you wanted.
It is no problem to revise earlier coding decisions if – after you have gained
some experience – you realized that you should have coded differently some
of the early chats.
We also attach the instructions we distributed to subjects before they
played the game in case you want to know more precisely how the game
was described to subjects and played.
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Coding guidelines
We want to know whether or not one or both subjects exchange messages
of the following type:
A. Messages confirming having reached an agreement/coordination
on a common plan for the current game (not in the past) to co-
operate on the choice of quantities.
Examples:
• after one subject proposes to chose some quantities 3,3 (or 4,4, or
3,4, or 4,3), the other replays “yes” or “OK” or, “let’s chose it”, or
“agreed,” or “choosing 3,3, is fine for me”, or “3-3 it is. that is what
I was thinking.”
• after one subject proposes to chose low quantities, e.g. to keep up
the price, the other replays “yes”, or “OK”, or “agreed”, etc.
If one subject sends a message of this type in a line of the chat reported
in the attached excel file, please put a 1 on the same row correspondent to
that message in column A, correspondent to “agreement/coordination”.
B. Messages containing an appeal to the opponent’s trustwor-
thiness or a request for a promise by the opponent to cooper-
ate/respect an agreement/not to cheat.
Examples: “please do not cheat”; “can I trust you?”; “promise you will
stick to the agreement.”
If one subject sends a message of this type, please put a 1 on the line
correspondent to the message in column B, correspondent to “request of
trust/promise.”
C. Messages in which the sender of the message explicitely promises/states
that he will be cooperate or will be trustworthy.
44
Examples: “I will play 3.” “I will not fight.” “you can trust me.” “I will
not let you down.”
If one subject sends a message of this type, please put a 1 on the line corre-
spondent to the message in column C, correspondent to “promise/statement
of trustworthiness.”
D. Messages containing a threat, a promise or forecast that some
punishment will follow a choice not to cooperate
Examples: “otherwise there is tit-for-tat.” “if I see several price with price
close to 5 I will change”, “if one of us tries to get advantage, the other will
notice at some point and it will go to hell.”
If one subject sends a message of this type, please put a 1 on the line corre-
spondent to the message in column D, correspondent to “threat/punishment.”
D1. Messages containing a forgiving threat, i.e. specifying that
the punishment will have a limited duration, after which it is
possible to go back to cooperation.
Example: “if one of us choose 4 units instead of 3, the next two period, we
can choose 4 units to punish each other”
If one subject sends a message about a treat/punishment specifying that
the punishment will only be lasting a limited time, then - besides putting
a 1 in column D as explained above - please put also a 1 on the line corre-
spondent to the message in column D1 correspondent to “forgiving threat.”
D2. Messages containing an unforgiving threat, i.e. specifying
that the punishment will have unlimited duration, it will go on
until the end of that match.
Example: “once i am noticing that you are rolling for 4, i will continue to
choose 4 until the end of the market”
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If one subject sends a message about a treat/punishment specifying that
the punishment will last forever/until the end of the match, then besides
putting a 1 in column D as explained above, please put also a 1 on the line
correspondent to the message in column D2 correspondent to “unforgiving
threat.”
E. Messages requesting, promising or discussing lenient behav-
ior, i.e. waiting for more signals before punishments until better
information arrives.
Example: “even if under negative shock, we should persist on choose 3”
If one subject sends a message about leniency, please put a 1 in column E
correspondent to “lenient behavior.”
Finally, it is fine to enter multiple 1’s in a column if more than one line
of the same chat falls within a certain category.
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F Examples of chats
Session 12, group 1, match 4; ∆ = 3.
Subject 5 : hi
Subject 1 : hello
Subject 5 : so this is a prisoners dilemma
Subject 1 : yes
Subject 1 : waht do you suggest?
Subject 5 : as long as we both constantly produce 3 units we will end up
with the most profits
Subject 1 : yes that is true
Subject 5 : so both 3?
Subject 1 : but can i trust you to produce 3?
Subject 5 : yes you can trust me
Subject 1 : okay
Subject 5 : i can trust you?
Subject 1 : when i think you did not play 3, i will start playing 4
Subject 1 : but if you play 3 you can trust me to do the same
Subject 1 : that gives the most profits
Subject 5 : okay I promise I play 3
Subject 1 : so lets do that!
Subject 5 : yes
Session 13, group 6, match 4; ∆ = 1.
47
Subject 14 : hi
Subject 14 : let’s stick to 3?
Subject 10 : hello. yes 3 it is
Subject 14 : great
Subject 14 : whenever the price goes below 5, though, I will change to 4
Subject 14 : and after I’ll keep on with 3
Subject 14 : do you have strategy about this?
Subject 10 : welllll price will easily get below 5..
Subject 14 : then we have to secure our profit
Session 15, group 4, match 5; ∆ = 2.
Subject 4 : Hi there
Subject 7 : hi,cooperate?
Subject 4 : yes please
Subject 7 : i trust you, so please trust me too, and we can see the truth
from the results
Subject 4 : If price doesn’t fluctuate around 6, you are not cooperating and
i will start producing 4 as well
Subject 7 : ok....
Subject 4 : hope I can trust you as welll
Subject 7 : but sometimes the shock may mislead, so we need to insist....
Subject 4 : anyway, Keep the shocks in mind
Subject 4 : true, i don’t stop 3 after 1 round
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Subject 4 : but based on more rounds
Subject 4 : Hope you honest
Subject 7 : yes, you are right
Subject 7 : * *
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